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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The legal theories advanced by Plaintiff are incorrect ap-
plications of the Law as it existed at the time of trial. 
There was no marriage between Plaintiff and decedent. There 
were no grounds established or facts alleged or proven, which 
would support the imposition of a constructive trust or setting 
aside a deed transferring real property located at 4145 Barker 
Road, Taylorsville, Utah (hereinafter cited as "Barker Road 
property'1) from decedent. 
There was no legally recognizable relationship to base an 
award of any property in decedent's estate to Plaintiff. 
The findings of the trial court were not supported by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
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ARGUMENT 
< 
I. NO RECOGNIZABLE RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEN DECEDENT 
AND PLAINTIFF TO BASE AN ORDER AWARDING PLAINITFF AN EQUITABLE 
DIVISION OF PROPERTY IN DECEDENT'S ESTATE. 
Plaintiff claims to be entitled to a division of property 
in appellant's estate and argues that such division should be 
governed by equitable principles. Plaintiff's theories are: 
(A.) Equitable property division in the marital context and, 
(B.) Imposition of constructive trusts. (Plaintiff's Brief at 
9-12). 
Plaintiff cites "U.C.A. Sec. 30-1-7.2" (sic) as the basis 
for a division of property in a marital setting. Presumably Utah 
Code Annot. §30-1-17.2 (1971) is meant as the correct section. 
Utah Code Annot. §30-1-17.2 (1971) is a subsection of Utah Code 
Annot. §30-1-17(1971) entitled "Action to determine validity of a 
marriage - Judgment of validity or annulment". The first sentence 
states that it applies lf[w]hen there is doubt as to the validity 
of a marriage ..." Likewise, Utah Code Annot. §30-1-17.2 concerns 
the accumulation of property or obligations "subsequent to the 
marriage...". There was no marriage in the instant case. (Trans-
cript 5, 40, 41, hereinafter cited as "Tr."). 
The cases cited by Plaintiff in support of her theory of 
equitable property division in a marital context are based on the 
existence of a marriage. The cases are all distinguishable from 
this action on the facts as follows: 
-2- i 
In Maple v, Maple, 566 P.2d 1229 (Utah, 1977), this court 
affirmed the award of a $1,200 settlement in an annulment of a 
marriage. 566 P.2d at 1230. The award was to provide money to 
plaintiff who was a citizen of Thailand so as to enable her to 
return there. Id. There is no similar need, nor was there a 
marriage, in the instant case. 
Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah, 1977) was an action to 
partition a house atid business assets. There was a marriage 
which was later invalidated. 572 P.2d at 406. The court below 
proceeded in contract rather than equity. Id. The house was 
purchased jointly and payment made from a business account. 
Plaintiff shared in the operation of the business. Id. Based on 
these facts, which again are not present in the instant case, 
this Court upheld the award to one-third interest in the house 
and a cash settlement to plaintiff. 572 P.2d at 407. 
In Parks V. Zions First National Bank, 673 P.2d 590 (Utah, 
1983), this Court upheld the imposition of a constructive trust 
in a factual situation in which a marital relationship existed. 
Speaking through Chief Justice Hall, the Court found: 
[t]his evidence clearly and adequately supports the 
trial court's finding that plaintiff's labors and 
earnings were responsible for the acquisition of a 
substantial portion of the marital estate. It is 
therefore appropriate to conclude that plaintiff had 
an "equitable interest" in the subject property, and 
that the total inclusion of such property in the 
estate of Mrs. Parks constituted an "unjust enrich-
ment" of her estate. Accordingly, we hold that the 
trial court's imposition of a constructive trust 
upon the estate of Mrs. Parks was justified, at 
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least as to that portion representing plaintiff's 
proven interest therein. 
Parks, 673 P.2d at 600. 
In our case, Plaintiff was not, through her labors or earn-
ings, responsible for a "substantial portion of the marital 
estate." Further, there was no marriage, and no "marital" estate 
to be divided. 
Plaintiff's reliance upon this first theory (marital rela-
tionship) is misplaced. As discussed, Utah Code Annot. §30-1-17.2 
(1971) is inapplicable as are the cases cited. The award of 
property by the trial court, imposition of a constructive trust, 
and setting aside the deed conveying the Barker Road property was 
error. 
The several arguments propounded by Plaintiff regarding 
the existance of a confidential relationship and grounds for 
the imposition of a constructive trust are discussed in the Brief 
of Appellant. A recent case which has come to Defendant's atten-
tion is Hiltsley v. Ryder, 59 Utah Adv. Rep. 35(1987). It con-
cerns the imposition of a constructive trust in a marital rela-
tionship. While the majority did not reach the merits of the 
trust imposition, Justice Zimmerman in his concurring opinion 
discusses the law of constructive trusts and the application of 
Section 160 of the Restatement of Restitution. 
Justice Zimmerman stated that the burden of proof required 
of the proponent of a constructive trust "cannot be met by simply 
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showing that there was a transaction between the parties apparent-
ly to the benefit of one and that they had a close family rela-
tionship." Hiltsley, 59 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37. He cited Matter of 
Estate of Coffin, 137 Ariz. 480, 671 P. 2d 921 (Ariz. Ct. App., 
1983) for the proposition that 
[i]n order to impose a constructive trust, in addition 
to the family relationship, there must be shown [the 
grantor's] age and infirmity on the one hand, actual 
dominance on the part of the grantee, and established 
course of management of the grantor's affairs by the 
grantee, or other similar facts making it inequitable 
to allow the grantee to prevail. 
Matter of Estate of Coffin, 137 Ariz, at 482, 671 P2d at 923. 
Justice Zimmerman found nothing in the record of Hiltsley 
to support a finding of constructive trust particularly in light 
of the clear and convincing evidentiary standard required. 59 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 37. He also concluded that the "imposition of 
a constructive trust was based on nothing more than conjecture" 
and advised the trial court that "it erred in finding a construc-
tive trust on the state of the facts before it." Id. 
The case at bar is likewise devoid of evidence to support a 
constructive trust. There was no finding of a confidential 
relationship, nor could there have been. The trial record is 
replete with evidence contrary to that required by Hiltsley. 
Particularly the Barker Street property transaction which was 
admitted by Plaintiff to be of her own free will. (Tr. 9, 10, 
42). The trial court erred in setting aside the deed and imposing 
a constructive trust. 
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II. THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WERE NOT BASED ON CLEAR 
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. 
Plaintiff argues that all of the evidence presented by her 
was uncontroverted and the findings of the trial court were based 
on clear and convincing evidence. This assertion is incorrect. 
An example of how erroneous Plaintiff's argument is, is evidenced 
by the finding of a relationship creating a common-law marriage 
when it was not recognized in Utah. 
The trial judge refused to hear testimony of a competent 
witness concerning decedent's views of the relationship and in-
tentions concerning the property. (Tr. 61-65). This testimony 
would have directly contradicted Plaintiff's testimony on all 
points, jki. As discussed in Appellant's brief, this testimony 
was admissible and should have been heard. It was error of the 
court to exclude it. 
Plaintiff, in further support of her position, cites a num-
ber of cases and one statute, Utah Code Annot. §30-1-17 (1971). 
She does not discuss the elements which satisfy this evidentiary 
standard, such as fraud, duress or undue influence. 
The cases cited by Plaintiff and the statute again all deal 
with legally recognized marital relationships. Parks, Maple, 
Edgar and Utah Code Annot. §30-1-17.2 (1971) have already been 
distinguished on the facts and application from this case. 
Plaintiff cites Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah, 1987) in 
support of her position that she is entitled to a share of Dece-
dent's estate. Burke was a divorce action where the parties had 
been married for approximately thirteen years. 733 P.2d at 134. 
In Burke, Defendant claimed the court committed error in not 
awarding him an interest in property that had been inherited by 
his wife during their marriage. Without agreeing that Burke 
applies, the only value it appears to have, in an examination of 
our facts, is the court's discussion of equitable property division 
in a divorce setting. That court stated that 
[t]he factors generally to be considered are the amount 
and kind of property to be divided; whether the property 
was acquired before or during the marriage; the source 
of the property; the health of the parties; the parties' 
standard of living, respective financial conditions, needs 
and earning capacities; the duration of the marriage; the 
children of the marriage; the parties' ages at time of 
marriage and of divorce; what the parties gave up by the 
marriage; and the necessary relationship the property divis-
ion has with the amount of alimony and child support to be 
awarded. Of particular concern in a case such as this is 
whether one spouse has made any contribution toward the 
growth of the separate assets of the other spouse and whether 
the assets were accumulated or enhanced by the joint efforts 
of the parties. 
773 P 2d. at 135. 
Implicit in the court's analysis is, of course, the fact 
that a marital relationship existed. Assuming arguendo that such 
a relationship did exist, an examination of the relevant factors 
illustrates the inequity of the lower court's order in awarding 
Plaintiff an interest in the West Leisure property. First of 
all, the parties' relationship was of a relatively short duration. 
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The residence on West Leisure was acquired by the Decedent during 
his first marriage* It was there where he raised his children, 
his heirs at law. Plaintiff made no contribution toward the pur-
chase, growth in value or enhancement in value of the West Lei-
sure residence. Our action does not deal with a divorce and is 
distinguishable from Burke on the facts, application of law and 
holding. 
Burnham v. Burnham, 716 P.2d 781(Utah, 1986), alfeo rel/ied 
upon by Defendant again deals with a divorce and property settle-
ment pursuant to a decree of divorce. In that case, the parties 
were married for fifty-one years. 716 P. 2d at 781. The facts 
of the instant case are not similar to those in Burnham. There 
was no marriage, nor was there a long-term relationship approach-
ing that found in Burnham. 
The Burnham case cited by Plaintiff is helpful in that 
it accurately states the burden placed on Defendant in appeal-
ing a property division as follows: 
[a] party appealing from a property division has the 
burden to prove that there was a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and 
prejudicial error; or the evidence clearly preponderated 
against the finding; or such a serious inequity has 
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. 
716 P.2d at 782. 
Defendant is confident that this burden has been met. The 
record clearly reflects there was at least a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the law, if not a clear abuse of discretion, 
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when the lower court found and relied on a common law marriage 
to support an order setting aside a deed and dividing property 
of decedent's estate. The trial court erred when it set aside 
that deed and imposed a constructive trust on the West Leisure 
and other property held by the estate of decedent without finding 
any elements required to impose such a trust. 
III. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DOES NOT DISTRIBUTE THE 
PROPERTY IN DECEDENT'S ESTATE EQUITABLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
Plaintiff believes that the order of the trial court was a 
fair and reasonable distribution of the assets in which she and 
decedent had an interest. Yet she admits she held no right, 
title or interest in the Barker Road property after she transferred 
it to decedent, (Tr. 10, 42, 45) or in the West Leisure Circle 
property (Tr. 42-44). 
Plaintiff cites her own uncontroverted testimony and Burke 
to support her position. Burke has already been distinguished 
from the instant case in section II of this brief. The reason 
Plaintiff's testimony was uncontroverted was because the trial 
court erroneously refused to hear evidence which would have contra-
dicted it. This issue is discussed in the Brief of Appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's argument and the lower court order are contrary 
to the law of this State. There was no marriage nor were there 
any findings to support an order setting aside the Barker Road 
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deed or the imposing a constructive trust on property of decedent's 
estate. The deed transferring the Barker Road property to decedent 
must be reinstated and the constructive trust lifted from the 
property of the estate of decedent. 
DATED this day of August, 1987. 
JERRALD D. CONDER 
Attorney for Appellant 
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eding SI ,000 or be bo th so fined and imprisoned. 
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30-1-16. Misconduct of county clerk - Penalty. 
Every clerk or deputy clerk who knowingly issues 
a license for any prohibited marriage shall be puni-
shed b y confinement in the state prison for a term 
not exceeding two years, or by fine in any sum not 
exceeding $1,000, or by both such fine and impris-
onment , and upon conviction shall be removed from 
his office by the judgment of the court before which 
his conviction is had; and if he willfully issues a 
license contrary to his duty as herein prescribed, he 
shall be fined not exceeding S1,000. 1953 
30-1-17. Action to determine validity of marriage 
- Judgment of validity or annulment. 
When there is doubt as to the validity of a marr-
iage, either par ty may, in a court of equity in a 
county where either party is domiciled, demand its 
avoidance or affirmance, but when one of the 
parties was under the age of consent at the time of 
the marriage, the other party, being of proper age, 
shall have no such proceeding for that cause against 
the party under age. The judgment in the action 
shall either declare the marriage valid or annulled 
and shall be conclusive upon all persons concerned 
with the marriage. T W7i 
30-1-17.1. Annulment - Grounds for. 
A marriage may be annulled for any of the foll-
owing causes existing at the time of marriage: 
(1) when the marriage is prohibited or void under 
chapter 1 of Title 30. 
(2) upon grounds existing at c o m m o n law. 1971 
30-1-17.2. Action to determine validity of 
marriage - Orders relating to parties, property 
and children - Legitimacy of children. 
If the parties have accumulated any property or 
acquired any obligations subsequent to the marriage, 
or there is a genuine need arising from economic 
change of circumstances due t o the marriage, or if 
there are children born, o r expected, the court may 
make temporary and final orders, and subsequently 
modify the orders, relating to the parties, their 
property and obligations, the children and their 
custody and visitation, and the support and maint-
enance of the parties and children, as may be equi-
table. The children born to the parties after the date 
of the marriage, shall be deemed the legitimate chi-
ldren of both of the parties for all purposes. 1971 
30-1-17.3. Age as basis of action to determine 
validity of marriage • Refusal to grant 
annulment. 
If an action to determine the validity of a marr-
iage is commenced upon the ground that one or 
both of the parties were prohibited from marriage 
because of their age, in addition to all of the fore-
going provisions, the following shall apply: The 
provisions of this code regarding marriage by a 
person or persons under the age of consent to the 
contrary notwithstanding, the court may, in its dis-
cretion, refuse to grant an annulment if it finds that 
it is in the best interest of the parties o r their chil-
dren, to refuse the annulment. The refusal shall 
make the marriage valid and subsisting for all pur-
poses. ifTl 
30-1-17.4. Action for annulment or divorce as 
alternative relief. 
Nothing herein shall be construed to prevent the 
filing of an action requesting an annulment or a 
divorce as alternative relief. 1971 
30-1-18 through 30-1-25. Repealed. "»« 
As used in this act, the word "obligor" shall meai 
a person who is obligated to support a minor chile 
I or children under a temporary or permanent ordei 
or judgment of any court or administrative body. 
1971 
Note: Section 30-1-26 through 30-1-29 were declared uncons-
titational by the Third Jadidal District Court, Sail Lake County, tad 
are aot enforced panaaat to Utah Attorney General's opinion lettei 
dated May 22.197S. 
30-1*27. Marriage by person under prior support 
obligation - Unlawful to apply for license 
without complying with act. 
It shall be unlawful for an obligor to marry or 
apply for a marriage license in this state or, if the 
obligor is domiciled in this state, to marry or apply 
for a marriage license in another state, without first 
complying with Section 30-1-28. W69 
30-1-28. Marriage by person under prior support 
obligation • Verified statements - Court order 
required if delinquent in payments. 
(1) A t the time of filing the marriage license 
application, the obligor shall file with the clerk a 
verified statement, signed by the person whom the 
obligor proposes to marry, stating that he or she 
understands the nature of the support obligation of 
the obligor and any additional information prescr-
ibed by the district judges. 
(2) At the time of filing the marriage license. 
application, the obligor shall file with the clerk a 
verified statement signed by the person, agency, 
institution or other entity having custody of the 
minor children, stating that the obligor is not then 
in default in the support obligation and any additi-
onal information prescribed by the district judges, 
or 
(3) If the obligor is unable to file the statement 
prescribed under Subsection (2), the obligor shall 
file a certified copy of a court order authorizing the 
issuance of a marriage license to the obligor. A 
petition for the order shall be upon forms prescribed 
by the district court judges and furnished by the 
clerk of the court and shall be filed with the district 
court in the county where (a) the court order or 
judgment of support was rendered, if in Utah; or 
(b) the minor children are domiciled, if in Utah; o r 
(c) the obligor is domiciled, if in Utah; o r (d) if 
none of the foregoing is applicable, the county 
where the obligor is making application for a mar-
riage license. 
The court shall order a hearing upon the petition 
and the clerk shall cause a copy of the petition to be 
personally served upon the person, agency, institu-
tion or other entity having custody of the minor 
children unless the court , for good cause, shall 
waive service. 
The court shall consider factors relating to the 
petitioner's past performance and future ability to 
comply with the prior court order in approving or 
denying the petition. 
(4) A refusal of the district court to issue an order 
authorizing the issuance of a marriage license to the 
obligor shall be an appealable order. A prior refusal 
shall not prejudice the right of the obligor to file 
subsequent petitions showing that the circumstances 
of the obligor have changed and the obligor is able 
to meet the support obligation. 19(9 
30-1-29. Marriage by person under prior support 
obligation - Leaving state to marry a 
misdemeanor. 
A n y domicilary of this s tate t o w h o m the provis-
I ions o f thic *j»/M^.- — •• 
